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2. Interestingly, he is aware of this when he is criticizing Plantinga's use of Satan as an
explanation of natural evil. He admits that this suggestion defeats the deductive problem
of evil, but he insists that its success as an answer to the probabilistic argument from evil
depends on how probable the theory of Satan is.
3. One particularly clear example of this is Martin's use of Bonjour's criticism of
foundationalism as part of his rebuttal of the foundationalism underlying Plantinga's claim
that beliefs about God may be properly basic. Unless Martin is willing to specify and
defend a non-foundationalist epistemology as part of an overall belief-system which
includes atheism, it is difficult to assess how successful his rebuttal of foundationalism is.
Many of the other beliefs which Martin uses in his criticism of the arguments of theists
are beliefs on which theists and atheists might well disagree, making all the more
difficult the assessment of their strength as reasons for doubting or rejecting some theistic
arguments.
4. The omission of Hasker's work is all the more surprising because Martin includes
an extended discussion of Rowe's argument from evil, and many of Hasker's papers are
in dialogue with Rowe. Perhaps the omission of process discussions of the problem of
evil may be explained on the grounds that process theism understands God in a way
different from Martin's definition, but he does depart from that definition himself in a brief
discussion of a "finite God" theodicy and in a discussion of views of God's knowledge
which deny that God knows the future actions of free agents.
5. He seems to consider faith a fom1 of intellectual assent, either justified by the
evidence (Aquinas) or going radically beyond or even against the evidence (Kierkegaard).
He uses the phrase "belief in God" to refer to having faith in God and to believing that
God exists, as though there were little or no difference between the two.
6. In his "Preface" Martin tells of the influence which childhood conversations with his
atheistic step-grandfather had on his becoming an atheist.
7. Martin acknowledges this in one footnote (n. 8 on p. 484), but he does not draw from
it the implications which I do in my review.

Divine, Action: Studies Inspired by the Philosophical Theology of Austin
Farrer, edited by Brian Hebblethwaite and Edward Henderson. Edinburgh:
T & T Clark, 1990. Pp. 281. Cloth.
CHARLES TALIAFERRO,

st. Olaf College.

It is fitting that Austin Farrer's work should inspire philosophical theology.
Austin Farrer (1904-1968), an Anglican priest and Oxford academic, was a
philosophical theologian of a high order. The present volume is not a commentary on Farrer's work, but a collection of papers which variously employ
Farrer's understanding of Divine agency as a point of departure in developing
independent positions in thy philosophy of God. Contributors discuss creation, the miraculous, double agency (God's action through human action),
the place of narrative in understanding Divine activity, epistemic conditions
for recognizing God's action, and the implications of our beliefs about God's
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actions for our political and moral practices. There is also an essay on Farrer's
spiritual life and his intellectual development. Hebblethwaite and Henderson
provide an able introduction to the ten papers which follow and the collection
of eight indexes. Farrer's books were rarely indexed and the inclusion of the
indexes prepared by Diogenes Allen is valuable. Readers may find it useful
to affix a copy of the relevant index to their books by Farrer. It is somewhat
ironic that the current volume, Divine Action, should contain so many indexes
for other books and not one for itself.
The first paper by Richard Harries, now the Anglican Bishop of Oxford,
offers an overview of Farrer's religious life, drawing attention to the unity
of his intellectual and spiritual pursuits, and his extraordinary capacity as a
homilest. Farrer was a gifted poet and preacher, and his style of writing often
enlivened and dramatized his technical philosophical works. The ending of
his masterful Finite and Infinite is a case in point. Sadly, few of Farrer's
sermons and poems are still in print. Perhaps one of the best colIections of
his sermons is A Faith of Our Own (1960) which contains an appreciative
introduction by C. S. Lewis. I do not think it exaggerated to compare his
sermons in terms of literary merit and religious illumination to the mature
sermons of Cardinal John Henry Newman.
Owen Thomas' paper, "Recent Thought on Divine Agency," surveys contributions to the field since the pUblication of his valuable anthology God's
Activity in (he World (1983). Curiously, his assessment of the current scene
differs radically from the one William Alston offers in his contribution, "How
to Think About Divine Action." Compare Thomas: "Theologians continue to
talk a great deal about God's activity in the world, and there continue to be
only a very few who pause to consider some of the many problems involved
in such talk" (p. 35) and Alston: "There seems to be a widespread impression
in theological circles, and among some philosophers who concern themselves
with such matters, that the idea of God acting 'in the world' is at best problematic, dubious, and puzzling, and, at worst, incoherent, unintelIigible, or
radically unacceptable" (p. 51). Judging by the survey Thomas provides and
the entries in his earlier anthology, the truth seems closer to Alston. Thomas'
essay, as with most of the contributions, presupposes familiarity with enough
philosophy of religion to make it difficult for an introductory student but
useful for those (graduate or undergraduate) who have already engaged the
literature.
Alston's paper is a model of clarity and rigor. He defends the coherence of
the belief that God acts in creation, preserving the world in existence and
interacting with persons. To my mind, he successfulIy defeats the objections
lodged by Langdon Gilkey and others that talk of Divine agency is unintelligible. Gilkey argues that the theistic depiction of God's action involves an
equivocation with respect to our talk of human agency and it also relies on
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a discredited understanding of nature and causation. Alston's conclusion, with
its triumphal ring, seems to me to be well deserved. "I conclude that the
equivocity bogey (or more generally, the unintelligibility bogey), like the
causal determinism bogey, is no more than a paper bogey. As with all bogeys,
the reasonable course is to stare them down and get on with our work" (p.
70).
In their introduction Hebblethwaite and Henderson offer some cautionary
remarks about Alston's paper which seem oddly juxtaposed. They note that
from Farrer's point of view Alston's defense of Divine intervention raises
""The religious worry ... over the implications of hidden manipulation by God
in the natural story of people's lives" (emphasis theirs, p. 6). But if they
bemoan a dangerous excessiveness on Alston's part when it comes to the
scope of Divine agency, they also note that, from a Farrer-informed point of
view, Alston has too narrow a notion of the scope of God's power. Farrer
affirms "What Alston in his discussion of conceptual possibilities seems by
implication to deny: that God can act in and through the free agency of human
beings and that it is precisely in the free pursuit of the divine will that we
are able most clearly to see God's action in the world" (p. 7). Interestingly
enough, Alston's hesitancy to embrace an unqualified thesis that God acts
through human activity is due to his concern with preserving human freedom
and thus, I assume, with preserving the view that God is not manipulative in
any conceptually or ethically repugnant sense. As it stands, however, Alston
is able to give a large berth to Divine agency and human freedom (pp. 57-61)
and readers interested in Alston's view of God-human convergence of action
may want to review his "The Indwelling of the Holy Spirit" (in Philosophy
and the Christian Faith, edited by T. V. Morris. Notre Dame: Notre Dame
Press, 1988).
In "Divine Action: The Doctrinal Tradition" Eugene TeSelle juxtaposes
Farrer's understanding of Divine agency with other alternatives, especially a
Whiteheadian model. This is a valuable paper, though I fail to see that TeSelle
has exposed any serious weakness in Farrer's view of God's action. TeSelle
writes: "One can understand his (Farrer's) assertion that God is intelligent
will. But this says more about how God is than how God acts. We can keep
saying that God's acts are not like ours, and that God's will takes effect
immediately. But this is mere assertion. Farrer has rejected the two models
that have seemed more or less adequate to the theological tradition-the
Aristotelian one of Pure Act which gives actuality to the finite process, and
the Platonic World-Soul which influences by "combining itself' with the finite
process" (pp. 77-78). Farrer's treatment of the will in Finite and Infinite and
The Freedom of the Will (the 1957 Gifford Lectures) is capable of improvement and development (as he himself insisted), but I do not share TeSelle's
judgment. I see no reason to prefer the other alternatives to Farrer's, and
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suggest that Alston's paper provides a useful resource enabling us to think of
Farrer's proposal as a plausible (and not "mere") assertion.
David Burrell's "Divine Practical Knowing; How an Eternal God Acts in
Time" is the shortest paper in the anthology, but the most ambitious. Burrell
understands God as pure act, and articulates a subtle philosophy of Divine
immanence and transcendence. In their introduction Hebblethwaite and Henderson encourage us to question whether Burrell's portrait of God would be
better articulated in terms of "primordial temporality" (p. 10), rather than
pure act, and it is indeed tempting to think of God as containing some kind
of potency given Burrell's view of human freedom. Without being able to do
justice to this debate here, I simply note that Burrell's paper provides an
important account of Divine agency which should stimulate a close reading
of Burrell's other published work where he developes further the metaphysics
of God which is at stake.
The contributions by David Brown, Rodger Forsman, Michael McLain, and
Thomas Tracy each take up the concept of double agency.
Brown's "God and Symbolic Action" provides an illuminating account of
Divine activity in liturgical contexts. Brown, like Alston, is uncompromising
when it comes to recognizing human freedom, yet he sees this as no barrier
to thinking of God and human persons in proximate communion of action.
He aims at giving a greater role to our unconscious life as an avenue for
Divine agency than Farrer recognized. Forsman's "'Double Agency' and
Identifying Reference to God" also focuses upon the interior, psychological
character of God-human interaction.
In "Narrative Interpretation and the Problem of Double Agency" McLain
endorses Alston's reply to Gilkey et aI., but unlike Alston, Brown and others,
he is wary of accepting (at least, as he says, "uncritically") the Biblical
narratives of God-human interaction. Some of his reservations here seem to
me to be problematic, but raise issues too complex to treat fairly here. I will
only cite one of the five principle reasons he offers.
"It may not be, as Hume argued, in principle impossible to be justified in
believing that a 'wondrous' event has occurred, for example, that Sarah's
child is due to the direct action of God, it is nevertheless difficult to justify
such a claim. To do so we would need to rule out as possible a naturalistic
explanation. But that would require that we have a complete account of
Sarah's condition, as well as one of all the natural causes relevant to that kind
of occurrence. It seems improbable that we could ever be in a position to
meet these conditions" (pp. 158, 159).

I do not dispute that it may be difficult to justify the belief that a given event
like Sarah's conceiving a child is owing to God's activity. Still, I do not think
that justifying such a belief requires that we rule out as impossible all naturalistic explanations. Justifying the belief that naturalistic explanations are
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less plausible than the supernatural one and that it is more reasonable to
accept the supernatural one than to withhold belief will suffice. We do not
need to go on to "rule out as possible a naturalistic explanation."
McLain ends his paper with an interesting discussion on the conceivability
of God's revelation to us being non-verbal. The discussion and his proposed
examples seem well taken and can be accepted while preserving the notion
that revelation through Divine activity is still propositional. Obviously propositions can be expressed and properly communicated non verbally. As an
aside, I do not think the occurrence of Divine verbal revelation, that is revelation through auditions brought about by God, need weigh against McLain's
and others concern that there be some "epistemic distance" between God and
the world (p. 159). Someone may receive verbal revelation and yet the evidence that the auditions were from God may be meager and far from compelling. There are cases in religious literature which give us reason to think
it is not unusual for there to be a level of uncertainty about auditions ostensibly from God. For a dramatic, fictional account of this, readers may find
William Golding's novel Pincher Martin (1956) valuable. The protagonist
has an array of visions and auditions, including some of which he is unsure
whether they originate in God's activity or are mere hallucinations.
Thomas Tracy's "Narrative Theology and the Acts of God" is a comprehensive and, I think, well conceived defense of a theistic account of God's
action in our lives. Tracy gives ample room to the affective dimension of
God's integral role in human life. Diogenes Allen's "Faith and the Recognition of God's Activity" develops Farrer's notion of the essential role of
faith in grasping God's interaction with us. Allen does this with skill and
shows that Farrer's strategy by no means leads one to an anti-intellectual
nightmare.
The final essay, "Divine Action and Human Liberation" by Jeffrey Eaton,
highlights the crucial role of presuming God to be an agent in a liberation
theology. The essay strikes a reasonable, refreshing course as it underscores
the constructive essential role of metaphysics for those in the liberation movement who give pride of place to orthopraxis. Along these lines, I am not sure
we need to eschew altogether the a priori high role in our metaphysics of
God. Eaton notes that "Farrer sought in his theology of will to be rid of every
form of apriorisl1I, philosophical and theological" (p. 219). It seems to me
that the Anselmian values and excellence (as in T. V. Morris' work, for
example), can provide more of an asset than a hindrance for one's theology
of suffering and political action.
Regrettably, the volume contains several printing errors. On page 58, 5
lines down, "that" should be substituted for "than." On page 111, 7 lines up,
"one" should be substituted for "on," and on page 198, the footnote should
read "1982" instead of "1882."

